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THE RECORD OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN RELATION TO  
THE ANNEXATION OF NONCONTIGUOUS TERRITORY.

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SPEECH

OF

HON. W. B. SHATTUC,  
OF OHIO,

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

MONDAY, MAY 14, 1900.

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WASHINGTON.

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S P E E C H  
OF  
HON. W. B. SHATTUC.

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The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and having under consideration the bill (H. R. 11537) making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, and for prior years, and for other purposes—

Mr. SHATTUC said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: Of the many inconsistencies presented by the record of the Democratic party none is more striking than that of its present attitude in opposition to the expansion resulting from the Spanish-American war. In some remarks submitted to this House on March 31 I called attention to the fact that the party which is now opposing expansion had in fact added every foot of territory to our original area, except that of Alaska, and in practically every case had done so without reference to the "consent of the governed;" and this fact has also been presented in much detail by others. Driven to the wall by this presentation of well-known historical facts, the response of the leaders of that party has been that the area which it added was contiguous and practically unoccupied territory, while that recently added (as an incident of the war with Spain) is noncontiguous and already occupied by people of another race and different characteristics.

In making this defense of their new attitude of opposition to expansion, they seem to imagine that the people of this country have forgotten comparatively recent history. In some former remarks upon this subject before this House I pointed out the fact that the Democratic party in three national conventions and two national platforms in 1860 adopted a resolution demanding that the next administration should obtain possession of Cuba, and without reference to the "consent of the governed." I now propose to examine more closely and somewhat in detail the history of that party with reference not only to Cuba but to other islands and noncontiguous territory, and show by indisputable evidence that its attitude from the very foundation of the party to the termination of the slavery period was in favor of the acquisition not only of Cuba but of other islands and noncontiguous territory—any spot, in fact, in which it could extend slavery and by so doing increase the vote of the slave-holding party in Congress.

I propose, first, to relate, in brief and consecutive form, the history of the Democratic efforts to acquire Cuba, the Hawaiian Islands, Yucatan, and the Danish West Indies, and to put on record such extracts from official documents and messages as will preserve in permanent form the expansion history of this Democratic party which is now denouncing expansion (which came to

us, 'excepting Hawaii, as incidents and results of the war with Spain) in the very territory of which its most distinguished leaders tried to obtain control. From Jefferson to Buchanan, the constant and consistent record of the party is for the acquisition of island as well as non contiguous territory, and it was only with the termination of slavery that the party, as a party, abandoned this effort. It was only after the possibility of the extension of this curse of mankind—slavery—had passed away that we find a Democratic President so far departing from the established principle of expansion as to be willing to haul down the American flag in Hawaii, where it had been hoisted in compliance with the wishes of the people of those islands and the approval of those of the United States, with the "consent" of both the governed and the governing.

No man is more revered by the Democratic party, if it is capable of genuine reverence for anybody or anything, than Thomas Jefferson. Its leaders annually celebrate the date of his birth, and point to him as the father of their party; yet Jefferson clearly favored the annexation of Cuba and put himself plainly on record in favor of it. In a letter written August 10, 1807, during his second term as President, and addressed to Madison, his Secretary of State, discussing the possibilities of a war with European countries, he said:

I had rather have war with Spain than not, if we are to go to war against England. Our Southern defenses can take care of the Floridas, volunteers from the Mexican army will flock to our standard, and rich pabulum will be offered to our privateers in the plunder of their commerce and coasts; probably Cuba would add itself to our confederation.

Two years later, writing again to Madison, who was then President, he said:

I suppose the conquest of Spain will soon offer a delicate question to you as to the Floridas and Cuba, which will offer themselves to you. Napoleon will certainly give his consent without difficulty to our receiving the Floridas, and, with some difficulty, possibly Cuba.

A week later he writes again:

That Napoleon would give us the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of these colonies can not be doubted, but that is no price, because they are ours in the first moment of the first war; but, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That will be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a *no plus ultra* as to us in that direction. We should then only have to include the North in our confederacy, which would be, of course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation, and I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.

Opportunity did not then offer for the Democracy to follow the advice of Mr. Jefferson and extend over Cuba the Constitution, which he was persuaded was "so well calculated for extensive empire and self-government," and therefore we find him again in 1823 writing to President Monroe a letter from which the official Democratic text-book issued by the Democratic party in the year of our Lord 1898, only two years ago, quotes triumphantly the following sentences:

It is better, then, to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation (Cuba) when solicited by herself. That addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest.

A few months later he wrote again to President Monroe:

I candidly confess that I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most interesting addition that could be made to our system of States.

Mr. Jefferson's advice in regard to Cuba was evidently not lost upon President Monroe, who, in a letter of June 30, 1823, quoted by Prof. James Morton Callahan, of Johns Hopkins University, in his recent work on Cuba and International Relations, says:

I have always agreed with you in the sentiment that too much importance could not be attached to that island (Cuba), and that we ought, if possible, to incorporate it into our Union, availing ourselves of the most favorable moment for it, hoping also that one would arise when it might be done without a rupture with Spain or any other power. I consider Florida and Cuba as forming the mouth of the Mississippi and other rivers emptying into the Gulf of Mexico within our limits, as of the Gulf itself, and in consequence that the acquisition of it to our Union is of the highest importance to our internal tranquillity as to our prosperity and aggrandizement.

As the country grew and the sentiment against slavery strengthened, the supporters of that Democratic institution in Congress saw more clearly every year the importance of following the advice of the founder of their party and extending over Cuba and whatever other territory they could annex that Constitution which Jefferson had described as "so well calculated for extensive empire and self-government." Even as early as 1836, in discussing a bill looking to a canal across Florida, it was urged that such a canal would protect Southern interests in case Cuba should pass into the possession of a foreign power, and, in reply to this, Randolph said:

If all constitutional restraints are to be pushed aside, let us take Cuba, and be done with it.

As the control of the slave power in Congress grew more attenuated with the growth of representation from the North, agitation for the annexation of Cuba increased. Everett, in his "Miscellaneous Essays," published in 1845, says:

The subject of Cuba will be brought, we fear, by the irresistible power of circumstances but too frequently to the notice of the people of the United States."

In the same year the Democratic Vice-President, Dallas, at a public dinner, toasted "The annexation of Cuba." In December of that year Mr. Levy (alias Yulee), a Senator from Florida, offered a resolution directing the President to open negotiations with Spain for the cession of Cuba, while a similar resolution was offered in the House.

President Polk, who came into office in 1845, cordially supported the Democratic sentiment in favor of additional slave territory, and, finding that the territory added through his war with Mexico could not be relied upon for that purpose, immediately after that war planned for the annexation of Cuba. Professor Callahan, discussing this question, says:

As soon as the struggle with Mexico was closed, Polk, ready to accept more land, undertook to annex Cuba. On May 30, 1848, at the beginning of a new Presidential canvass, and even before the ratification of peace with Mexico, he brought the subject before his Cabinet, and favored a fair purchase, and on June 6 he brought the subject before the Cabinet again. A day or so later news of the peace with Mexico arrived. \* \* \*

Polk was a man of oral confidence, and he and Buchanan, his Secretary of State, preferred to wrap the negotiations with Spain as to Cuba in secrecy. Polk's instructions to Saunders, then minister to Spain, were profoundly confidential; they were written June 17, 1848, but held back from the clerks for record until February 25, 1849. In his instructions Polk told Saunders to begin his negotiations by a confidential conversation concerning the distractions in Cuba: \* \* \* to avoid any absolute refusal in treating which might embarrass the United States hereafter in acquiring Cuba, and to suggest that, on account of the situation in the Spanish cabinet and the relations with foreign governments, it was proper to avoid record of the Cuban negotiations.

That this statement of President Polk's negotiations for the purchase of Cuba is accurate can not be doubted, and the assertion is sustained by such distinguished authority as the present leader on the Democratic side of this House, Hon. JAMES D. RICHARDSON, of Tennessee, who, in the index to his Messages and Papers of the Presidents, says of Cuba:

President Polk made a proposal in 1848 for the purchase of the island by the American Government for \$100,000,000.

President Polk's negotiations were unsuccessful because the Spanish Government did not desire to part with Cuba; but the slave power in Congress continued the agitation in favor of the scheme, with the election of Pierce, who succeeded him in the White House in 1853. Speeches were made in the House and Senate in favor of the acquisition of Cuba. Senator Mason, afterwards of Confederate fame, in a speech favoring the acquisition of Cuba said that its acquisition should not be attempted by forcible or unlawful methods, but added that "in the fullness of time the fruit will ripen and fall from the parent stem." Cass expressed a willingness to purchase Cuba, even at an extravagant price, and said:

It is pretty well known that I have a capacious swallow for territory, although we can wait if necessary and spend the time digesting our last acquisitions (the result of the war with Mexico), that sit lightly on the stomach and promise to promote the health of the body politic beyond expectation.

Soulé urged that the Government should not delay too long in plucking the Cuban fruit referred to by Mason as likely to "ripen and fall from the parent stem in the fullness of time," and asked:

Will the plucking of it when ripe be less marauding than the plucking of it while still green?

Mallory, also representing the slave power, was even more radical than Soulé, and, referring to the advantages of Cuba and the necessity of its acquisition, remarked that "Heaven helps those that help themselves."

President Pierce, when he came into office, made no concealment of his desire to extend the control of that constitution which Mr. Jefferson had characterized as "so well calculated for extensive empire and self-government," and in his inaugural address said:

Our position and attitude might render the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction eminently important for our protection.

In the month following the election—  
says Callahan—

Buchanan had told Pierce that he should make the purchase of Cuba the chief aim of his Administration, and thus render his name as illustrious as that of Jefferson, who had procured Louisiana for the Union.

With a view to this, apparently, Buchanan was sent as minister to London, Soulé to Spain, and Mason to France; and on April 3, 1854, Marcy, Pierce's Secretary of State, sent Soulé confidential instructions as to the purchase of Cuba, saying that the President considered \$100,000,000 a liberal price, but that he would not have the annexation fail even if an additional thirty millions were required. Soulé entered upon the negotiations as directed, but they were again rejected by Spain, and this combination of supporters of the slave power evidently concluded that if fair means were unsuccessful others should be attempted; and, as a consequence, Ministers Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé were directed to hold a conference and announce the sentiment which they



represented upon this subject. They held that conference at Ostend and gave to the public the celebrated "Ostend manifesto," which said:

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. \* \* \* After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously injure our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power.

A declaration of which Lossing, the historian, says:

The bold iniquity of the proposition amazed honest men in both hemispheres.

Even the failure of these attempts of Pierce's Administration to obtain Cuba by purchase, or, if public sentiment would consent, by force, did not discourage the Democratic party, for in the national convention nominating Buchanan as Pierce's successor, it declared that—

The Democratic party will expect of the next Administration that every proper effort be made to insure our ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico and to maintain permanent protection to the great outlets which are emptying into its waters—and that the Administration of Franklin Pierce has been true to Democratic principles.

President Buchanan, who followed Pierce, continued the efforts, openly and secretly, in favor of the annexation of Cuba. In a message to Congress, on December 6, 1858, he said :

It has been made known to the world by my predecessors that the United States have, on several occasions, endeavored to acquire Cuba from Spain by honorable negotiation. \* \* \* The island of Cuba, from its geographical position, commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade, foreign and coastwise, from the valley of that noble river now embracing half the sovereign States of the Union. With that island under the dominion of a foreign power this trade, of vital importance to these States, is exposed to the danger of being destroyed in time of war, and it has hitherto been subjected to piratical injury and annoyance in times of peace. Our relation with Spain, which ought to be of the most friendly character, must always be placed in jeopardy while the constituted colonial government over the island shall remain in its present condition.

While the possession of the island would be of vast importance to the United States, its value to Spain is comparatively unimportant. \* \* \* The publicity which has been given to our former negotiations upon this subject and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purpose render it expedient, before making another attempt to renew those negotiations, that I should lay the whole subject before Congress. This is especially necessary, as it becomes indispensable to success that I should be entrusted with the means of making an advance to the Spanish Government immediately after signing the treaty, without awaiting the ratification of it by the Senate. I am encouraged to make this suggestion by the example of Mr. Jefferson previous to the purchase of Louisiana from France, and by that of Mr. Polk in view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico. I lay the whole subject before Congress and commend it to their careful consideration.

In another message, December 19, 1859, he says:

I need not repeat the arguments which I urged in my last annual message in favor of the acquisition of Cuba by fair purchase. My opinions on that measure remain unchanged. I therefore again invite the serious attention of Congress to this important subject. Without a recommendation on this policy on their part, it will be impossible to institute negotiations with any reasonable prospect of success.

In his message of December 3, 1860, President Buchanan says:

I reiterate the recommendation contained in my annual message of December, 1858, and repeated in that of December, 1859, in favor of the acquisition of Cuba from Spain by fair purchase. I firmly believe that such an acquisition would contribute essentially to the well-being and prosperity of both countries in all future time.

Nothing is said in any of the three recommendations of President Buchanan as to any attempt to inquire into the wishes of the people of Cuba or to obtain the "consent of the governed" before the Government of the United States should be extended over the island. So anxious was he, however, upon this subject that, in a special message to Congress on January 21, 1859, in answer to a resolution of inquiry calling for correspondence between the Government of the United States and that of Spain regarding the purchase of the island, he says:

It appears that no such correspondence has taken place which has not already been communicated to Congress. In my last annual message I stated, in reference to the purchase of Cuba, that "the publicity which has been given to our former negotiations on this subject and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purposes render it expedient, before making another attempt to renew the negotiations, that I should lay the whole subject before Congress." I still entertain the same opinion, deeming it highly important, if not indispensable, to the success of any negotiation which I might institute for this purpose that the measure should receive the previous sanction of Congress.

During the Buchanan Administration the annexation of Cuba continued to receive attention in Congress. A bill was introduced by Senator Slidell providing for an appropriation of \$30,000,000 to facilitate the acquisition of Cuba, and was favorably reported. In the discussion which followed, Robert Toombs, who once promised to call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill, expressed a desire for Cuba, both for its wealth and as a stepping-stone across the Caribbean, and saw no objection to its acquisition by treaty or by war.

It ought to be declared to be our settled policy—

he said,

as far as it can honestly and fairly be done, to unite all the Tropics under our flag.

Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, favored the acquisition by force rather than by purchase.

I propose—

said he—

that we shall take it now—take it in its perfection, redolent with the rich colors of its budding flowers and tropical fruits and productions.

Taylor, of Louisiana, desired it in order to increase the slavery influence in Congress, and plainly said so. He offered as a substitute for the bill another measure specifically authorizing the President to pay \$120,000,000 for Cuba and to issue bonds for the amount, and also to provide for erecting Cuba into a new State. Benjamin, of Louisiana, also spoke in favor of the measure. Stephens, of Georgia, afterwards vice-president of the Confederacy, favored expansion not only as to Cuba but to Mexico and Central America; and on July 6, 1859, Jefferson Davis, in a speech before the Mississippi Democratic convention, said that the laws against the slave trade should be repealed and Cuba should be acquired.

It would—

he said—

benefit the whole Union if the Union continued, and be a still greater advantage to the South in case of a new confederacy.

With all these efforts of a Democratic President in the White House and Democrats in Congress, the attempt failed, and the Democratic convention which met in Charleston to nominate a

successor to Buchanan adopted a resolution already quoted by me in this House:

*Resolved*, That the Democratic party are in favor of the acquisition of the island of Cuba upon such terms as shall be honorable to ourselves and just to Spain.

That convention failed to nominate, but the two Democratic conventions held at Baltimore and Richmond, which were its successors and which made separate nominations for the Presidency, each adopted that resolution, which expressed the sentiment of the Democratic party from the time of Jefferson to the close of that campaign, which ended slavery, and therefore ended Democratic ambitions for Cuba.

#### DEMOCRATIC SCHEME TO ANNEX YUCATAN.

The record of the Democracy in favor of expansion to noncontiguous territory does not cease with the history of its Cuban negotiations and schemes. President Polk, when the expansion fever was at its height, in a special message to Congress April 29, 1848, called attention to the opportunities for expansion then existing in Yucatan, saying:

The white inhabitants of Yucatan have been reduced to a condition of extreme suffering by an insurrection of the Indians, and have already, through their constituted authorities, implored the aid of this Government to save them from destruction, offering, in case this should be granted, to transfer the dominion and sovereignty of the peninsula to the United States. Similar appeals for aid and protection have been made to the Spanish and English governments.

We have now authentic information that if the aid asked from the United States be not granted such aid will probably be obtained from some European power, which may hereafter assert a claim to dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan. Yucatan has never declared her independence, and we treated her as a State of the Mexican Republic. For this reason we have never officially received her commissioner, but whilst this is the case we have to a considerable extent recognized her as a neutral in our war with Mexico. While still considering Yucatan as a portion of Mexico, if we had troops to spare for this purpose, I would deem it proper, during the continuance of the war with Mexico, to occupy and hold military possession of her territory.

#### THE DANISH WEST INDIES WANTED.

Another attempt at the addition of noncontiguous territory was made by President Andrew Johnson after his desertion of the Republican party and during the time in which he was receiving the cordial support of the Democratic party as President. In a message to Congress, on December 3, 1867, he says:

The West India islands were settled and colonized by European states simultaneously with the settlement and colonization of the American continent. \* \* \* Although possessing considerable commercial value, they have been held by the several European states which colonized or at some time conquered them chiefly for the purpose of military and naval strategy.

In our Revolutionary war ports and harbors of the West India islands were used by our enemies to the great injury and embarrassment of the United States. We had the same experience in our second war with Great Britain. In our recent civil war the rebels and their piratical and blockade-running allies found facilities in the same ports for the work which they too successfully accomplished in injuring and devastating the commerce which we are now engaged in rebuilding. \* \* \* I agree with our early statesmen that the West Indies naturally gravitate to and may be expected ultimately to be absorbed by the continental states, including our own. I agree with them, also, that it is wise to leave the question of such absorption to the principles of natural political gravitation. The islands of St. Thomas and St. John, which constitute a part of the group called the Virgin Islands, seem to offer us advantages immediately desirable, while their acquisition should be secured in harmony with the principles to which I have alluded. A treaty has therefore been made with the King of Denmark for the cession of these islands, and will be submitted to the Senate for consideration.

## ACQUISITION OF SAN DOMINGO SUGGESTED.

Mr. Johnson's ambition to cause the islands of the Caribbean to "gravitate to the United States" was not confined to St. Thomas and St. John, for, in a message sent to Congress on December 9, 1868, after again calling attention to his treaty with the King of Denmark for the purchase of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John on the "best terms then attainable," he calls attention to conditions in other islands in those waters, and says:

It can not be long before it will become necessary for this Government to lend some effective aid to the solution of the political and social problems which are continually kept before the world by the two republics of San Domingo, and which are now disclosing themselves more distinctly than heretofore. The subject is commended to your consideration with all the more earnestness because I am satisfied that the time has now arrived when so direct a proceeding as a proposition for annexation of the two republics of the island of San Domingo would not only receive the consent of the people interested but would also give satisfaction to all other foreign nations.

I am aware that upon the question of further extending our possessions it is apprehended by some that our political system can not successfully be applied to an area more extended than our continent, but the conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that, with increased facilities for intercommunication between all portions of the earth, the principles of free government as embraced in our Constitution, if faithfully maintained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world. The attention of the Senate and Congress is again respectfully invited to the treaty for the establishment of commercial reciprocity with the Hawaiian Kingdom. \* \* \* A reciprocity treaty, while it could not materially diminish the revenues of the United States, would be a guaranty of the good will and forbearance of all nations until the people of the islands shall, of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union.

## DEMOCRATIC ATTEMPT TO ANNEX HAWAII.

It was not alone to Cuba, or Yucatan, or the islands of the Caribbean that the Democracy looked for expansion and extension of slave territory, but an earnest effort was made for the annexation of Hawaii. Under the administration of President Pierce, his minister to the Hawaiian Islands, Mr. Gregg, was directed to negotiate for the annexation of those islands to the United States, and in a communication to him, dated April 14, 1854, Mr. Pierce's Secretary of State, Marcy, says:

In your general instructions you were furnished with the views of this Government in regard to any change in the political affairs of the Sandwich Islands. The President was aware when these instructions were prepared that the question of transferring the sovereignty of those islands to the United States had been raised and favorably received by many official individuals residing therein. You were informed that it was not the policy of the United States to accelerate such a change; but if in the course of events it became unavoidable, this Government would much prefer to acquire the sovereignty of these islands for the United States than to see it transferred to any other power. \* \* \*

The information contained in your last dispatch renders it probable that the ruling powers of that Government will have presented to you an offer of the sovereignty of their country to the United States. The President has deemed it proper that you should be furnished with instructions for the guidance of your conduct in such an emergency. With this dispatch you will be furnished with full power to treat with the present authorities of the Hawaiian Government for the transfer of the Sandwich Islands to the United States. \* \* \* It is reasonable to anticipate that the present rulers and chiefs would expect that some provision would be made as compensation to them for the surrender of their political possession.

This provision could not be, as I conceive, any other than a pecuniary allowance. In this respect the United States would manifest toward them a liberal spirit. Annuities to the amount of \$100,000, to be distributed in such manner as they would prefer, might be secured to them in the treaty. \* \* \* If you should succeed in making a treaty transferring the islands to the United States, it is desirable that it should receive the ratification of the

Hawaiian Government before it is sent here. \* \* \* I have good reason to believe that some of the leading powers of Europe would be very unwilling to see the Sandwich Islands become a part of the United States. These considerations and others make it important that you should bring it to a close as expeditiously as possible.

These instructions to Minister Gregg resulted in the negotiation of a treaty of annexation. It was forwarded to the United States, and was so satisfactory to President Pierce and his Secretary of State that the latter said, in a communication to Minister Gregg:

The President desires me to assure you that he takes no exception whatever to your course in this difficult and embarrassing negotiation, but, on the contrary, it is highly approved. Your efforts have been properly directed, and your ability is appreciated and commended. It gives me pleasure to communicate the President's approbation of your conduct.

He adds, however, that the President directs him to say that certain features of the treaty are unsatisfactory, and says:

There are in his mind strong objections to the immediate incorporation of the islands in their present condition into the Union as an independent State. It was expected that the Hawaiian Government would be willing to offer the islands to the United States as a Territory and leave the question in relation to their becoming a State to the determination of this Government, unembarrassed by stipulations on that point. The interests of both parties would seem to indicate this as the wisest course. A treaty which would embarrass the United States on this question would therefore be objectionable.

Thus it appears that a Democratic President under whose Administration the acquisition of both Cuba and Hawaii was pushed with the greatest vigor, objected at the last moment to the acceptance of the Hawaiian territory coupled with any agreement which would require that it should be brought in as a State into the Union, a sentiment quite out of accord with that which we have recently heard in Congress with reference to territory of this character more recently acquired. Whether this trifling disagreement would have been overcome and the Hawaiian Islands annexed will never be known, as the sudden death of the Hawaiian King ended the negotiations before they could be completed, and Pierce's successor, Buchanan, contented himself with directing his efforts to the acquisition of Cuba, as already detailed.

We see, therefore, that the attitude of the Democratic party, from Jefferson to Buchanan, was one of constant desire for expansion, not alone in contiguous area, but in noncontiguous and island territory, especially in any spot where slavery might be extended, and thus the control of the slave power in Congress and in national affairs maintained.


As has already been stated, every foot of contiguous territory added to the original area of the United States was made by the Democratic party and without reference to the "consent of the governed," while the facts which have just been presented show with equal clearness that the objections now offered to the expansion, which has come as an incident of the war with Spain, found no place in the minds of Democrats during all the years in which they were plotting for the annexation of Cuba, Hawaii, Yucatan, Haiti and San Domingo, and the Danish West Indies.

President after President, Secretary of State after Secretary of State, foreign minister after foreign minister, planned, plotted, and schemed to bring about the annexation, peaceably if convenient, by force if necessary, of islands and other noncontiguous territory, and in not one instance was it proposed that the wishes of the people affected should be tested in any manner which

should determine the "consent of the governed" as a prerequisite for the step thus proposed. On the contrary, the underlying motive with at least a large share of those actively engaged in pushing forward these annexation propositions was to find additional area upon which they could extend that outrageous form of government, slavery, which they were then exercising over millions of people in the Southern States without their consent.

I desire to append to my remarks a map which shows the various areas annexed by Democratic Administrations, with the dates of action and area of each addition.

## APPENDIX.
















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